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Abstract 
 
What are the links between natural resources and violent conflict? How do formal, informal, 
and ‘hybrid’ governance arrangements shape those links? What is the impact on the position 
of conflict-affected populations of these arrangements? This paper conducts a systematic 
review of the evidence base of peer-reviewed and ‘grey’ literature on resource governance in 
conflict-affected areas. It finds limited consensus on how to approach and conceptualise 
resource-related issues in conflict-affected areas. Many of the existing theories rely on 
normative assumptions and lack empirical support. Three areas are highlighted as 
demanding further research: hybrid resource governance, rebel resource governance, and 
the position and strategies of conflict-affected populations. 
  
Introduction 
 
Recent years have witnessed a growing preoccupation with the quality of the evidence base 
of research in social sciences. Social scientists have come under increasing pressure to be 
more transparent about their ways of data collection and analysis, to demonstrate the 
empirical groundedness of their theoretical and observational statements, and to ensure the 
verifiability of their research findings (Young et al. 2002; Solesbury 2001). This rising 
pressure can be attributed to a combination of factors, including the growing political 
interference with science and the concomitant demand for ‘useful’ research (Lather 2004), 
the influence of evidence-based medicine which arrived in the beginning of the 1990s (Guyat 
et al. 1992; Davies et al. 2000), the ‘publish or perish’ ethos and the increasing importance of 
publishing in peer-reviewed journals with strict scientific standards (Smeyers & Burbules 
2011) and finally the growing interest in, and acknowledgement of, the value of previous 
research and existing data (Solesbury 2001). 
While we recognise the dangers associated with the uncritical adoption of an evidence-based 
approach (e.g. positivism; an unwarranted belief in the existence of objective scientific 
knowledge; lack of attention to the politics of research and to the complexity of the 
relationship between knowledge and power; an exaggerated confidence in the measurability 
of scientific quality etc., (see Hammersley 2005; Marston & Watts 2003), a systematic 
literature review of the type designed, applied and promoted by scholars working in the 
evidence-based paradigm has several merits. Apart from the fact that it forces one to 
systematically collect all available literature on a given topic and to assess its value according 
to a fixed procedure and a set of clearly defined criteria, it also allows policy-oriented 
researchers to identify and question the scientific assumptions underlying certain policy 
interventions. In other words, a systematic literature review can be an excellent tool for a 
kind of reality check – to find out whether, from a social scientific point of view, 
policymakers are (still) addressing the most important and appropriate issues, and whether 
the efficiency and effectiveness of their initiatives are being jeopardised by the fact that they 
are based on erroneous ideas or questionable scientific findings.  
This paper aims to contribute to such an evidence-based approach and present a systematic 
review of the literature on the assumed links between resources, conflict and governance. 
Conflicts such as the wars in Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) have raised growing concerns that natural resources such as diamonds, oil, gold, 
tantalum, tin and tungsten either cause conflict or shape the strategies of armed actors. These 
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concerns have encouraged policymakers to design new frameworks of intervention, aimed at 
cutting the assumed links between armed groups and resources and at promoting transparent 
models of resource governance. However, these interventions often rely on unsupported 
assumptions regarding the role of natural resources in the motivations of combatants and the 
dynamics of conflict. Moreover, interventions rarely consider the populations in conflict-
affected regions, who play an integral role in these dynamics.  
This paper will assess the quality of the evidence used to analyse the links between resources 
and violent conflict, as well as the determinants of resource governance in conflict-affected 
regions. We are motivated by the following question: what is the quality of information that 
is used to analyse the different ways resource governance affects people in fragile and 
conflict-affected areas? More specifically, we want to know: (i) the quality of information 
that supports the dominant arguments on the links between natural resources and conflict; 
and (ii) the quality of information on hybrid arrangements which define access to and control 
over natural resources in conflict-affected areas.  
In order to answer these questions conclusively, we conduct a critical review and synthesis of 
the existing information and quality of evidence in peer-reviewed literature and influential 
research reports on resource governance in conflict-affected and fragile areas. We have 
decided to use 1990 as a cut-off year because it is widely acknowledged in the literature that 
the end of the Cold War and economic globalisation have had a significant impact on warfare 
throughout the world (Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001) and have contributed to the growing 
importance of natural resources as causes or drivers of violent conflicts (Berdal 2003). We 
are specifically concerned with literature that addresses the experiences and perspectives of 
conflict-affected populations. We concentrate on non-renewable lootable and/or tradable 
natural resources, including oil.1 
The next sections of the paper summarise the systematic literature review beginning with an 
outline of the search strategy, methodology, and data extraction strategy and then engaging 
critically with the surveyed literature. The authors summarise the key arguments, assess the 
quality of the evidence, and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the available 
information under the following themes: (i) natural resource abundance and the ‘resource 
curse’; (ii) greed as an explanatory factor of armed struggle; (iii) war economies, criminality 
and rebel governance; (iv) hybrid (resource) governance arrangements, particularly in 
borderlands; and (v) resource governance in post-conflict reconstruction. A final, concluding 
section identifies the gaps in the evidence and suggests elements for a future research agenda 
on resource governance in conflict-affected areas.  
  
Methodology 
Systematic literature searches  
The systematic selection of relevant studies was defined by several inclusion criteria. We 
                                                        
1
 These resources have taken centre stage in the literature on resource abundance and conflict, while the 
assumed struggle for control over these resources has inspired a broad spectrum of policy responses. Existing 
literature and policy responses have paid the most attention to diffuse resources, i.e. those “spatially spread over 
vast areas and often exploited by less capital-intensive industries” (Le Billon 2004: 8), but point resources (i.e. 
those “spatially concentrated in small areas (which), can be exploited by capital-intensive extractive industries”, 
Le Billon, 2004: 8) will be part of our review as well. Other natural resources such as water and land have 
received increased attention from scholars and policymakers, but will not be included.  Nor will the literature on 
resource scarcity and pastoralism be integrated into our assessment.   
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reviewed research conducted in the following countries and regions: Central Africa (DRC, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, Central African Republic, Kenya, Angola), the Sahel (Nigeria, Mali, 
Niger, Chad), the Caucasus, and Afghanistan-Pakistan. These conflict-affected regions were 
selected on the basis of the presence of natural resources as defined above, and the 
recognition that these resources have been identified as complicating factors in local conflict. 
We only included research that dealt with the impact of resources on conflict-affected 
populations or provided local-level empirical data. As our search was mainly based on 
English-language databases most of the selected literature was in English. However, 
additional searches were carried out in French, German and Dutch. 
The search strategy aimed to identify existing and relevant literature in social sciences and 
included several steps. Search strategy 1 was a database-driven search. Several databases 
were identified which are commonly accepted as the most important in social sciences and 
provide the most extensive sets of academic and non-academic literature: Scopus, ISI Web of 
Science, IBSS, CIAO, EBSCO (Business Source Complete, EconLit, Historical Abstracts, 
International Political Science Abstract, Peace Research Abstract), CABI, Google Scholar 
and Worldcat. A single search string was selected and used in all the databases.2 All search 
results were screened by title and abstract. 
Although systematic, the database-driven search strategy had mixed results in terms of 
identifying the key literature on the subject or identifying new and influential material. A 
considerable number of references that were suggested by experts as essential reading were 
not identified through the search strategy and there was a particular bias against ethnographic 
work. Minor changes in the search terms or syntax also caused important variations in result 
numbers; the particular order of criteria led to varying outcomes and increased the risk of 
distortions in the final set of results. The process of fixing a single search string, although 
necessary for consistency, thus risked introducing arbitrary selection or limiting results. 
Given these limitations, two additional strategies were used to complete our search and to 
ensure an accurate picture of the state of the field. Search strategy 2 was the addition of 
literature based on individually identified key references. This search followed the rules of a 
more traditional literature review, including a ‘snowball search’ through bibliographies of 
influential studies.  This added 109 sources to the list of references. Search strategy 3 was the 
identification of potential studies by peers/authorities in the field. 30 peers (both researchers 
and practitioners) were selected and invited to identify 5 key sources, including books, 
articles, working papers and reports. These references were added to the results of the 
previous strategies. 12 experts responded and an additional 32 studies were added to the list 
of references.  
The titles and abstracts of the final results of these search strategies were screened by the 
research team according to the inclusion criteria of the study. From the 412 references found, 
198 studies were included in the evidence review. Table 1 summarises the number of hits 
from the fixed search string in the various databases and search strategies, the number of 
articles scanned by the researchers, and the final number of references selected for the review. 
 
                                                        
2
 Hybrid* OR institution* OR govern AND resource AND fragile* or conflict OR war OR border* OR 
frontier*. This search string combines the most important concepts that encompass the literature outlined above. 
This was further refined with a second search string of terms that refer to the “local level”: Local*, 
Participatory*, Livelihoods, Grassroots*, Pro-poor*, Popular*, Subaltern*, Citizen*, Civilian*, Survival*, 
Coping*, Ordinary*, Everyday life. 
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Table 1: Search Results 
 Database Used # hits # scanned hits 
# hits 
selected 
Search 
Strategy 1 
Scopus 7,729 1,500 11 
ISI Web of Science 1,029 1,029 32 
IBSS 3,826 3,826 35 
CIAO 627 627 15 
EBSCO 3,381 3,381 86 
CABI 0 0 0 
Google Scholar 241,000 1,500 24 
Worldcat 964,274 1,000 3 
Total of Search strategy 1 206 
Search 
Strategy 2 References added 109 
Search 
Strategy 3 References added 32 
 
 Grand Total: 412 
Final Total After Filtering Process 198 
 
Overview of the surveyed literature 
The papers identified by the search strategies were read, graded and annotated following the 
grading method developed by the Justice and Security Research Programme.3 Most of the 
papers selected for review relied on qualitative methods to build their evidence base: a 
plurality was interview-based (57), followed by qualitative, observation-based (18), other 
type of data/information (19), and gathering own data (6). Only 18 references were based on 
quantitative methods, with 12 using existing data and 6 gathering own data. 36 papers were 
coded as containing less than 10% empirical data, 39 as containing between 10% and 50%, 
and 36 as containing over 50%.4 Papers containing more than 10% empirical data were given 
an average score of 2.68 on data quality (SD 0.68) and 3.17 on quality of analysis (SD 0.61). 
Papers containing 10–50% of empirical data scored significantly lower (over half a point 
lower) than papers containing more than 50% empirical data. There was no statistically 
significant difference in scores received by papers found through the database search and 
those found through the peer search. The correlation coefficient between the score on the 
quality of the data and how insightful the paper was rated in terms of data/information is 0.42. 
The correlation coefficient between the score on the quality of the analysis and how 
insightful the paper was rated in terms of analysis is 0.51.   
Most of the papers reviewed tended to be single case studies. The cases of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (14) and Sierra Leone (8) were most prevalent; other case studies 
                                                        
3
 For more information on this programme, see: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/jsrp/. 
4
 Some papers fall into multiple categories and were counted several times. 
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included Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Liberia, the Balkans, Ivory Coast, and Uganda. 
Several papers (17) dealt with the ‘greed or grievance’ discussion or analysed the ‘resource 
curse’ argument. Other papers (29) focused on hybrid governance in conflict-affected areas, 
either theoretically or through case studies; a limited number of these references paid 
particular attention to resources or informal economies. Some papers (7) discussed the issue 
of natural resources from a borderlands perspective. A number of papers (11) addressed 
issues related to ‘war economies’, including global-local links, and shadow networks. Finally, 
several papers (8) dealt with the challenges of resource governance in post-conflict settings 
and issues of governance, development, and decentralisation, or paid particular attention to 
artisanal and small-scale mining. 
In many cases it proved difficult to assess the methodology and thus the methods of data 
collection used. This is partly because in some disciplines there is no tradition of describing 
in detail how information is gathered and analysed. Ethnographic studies in particular were 
less likely to explain their research design and process and to employ non-systematic 
collection of data, informal discussions, and unstructured interview processes. Many 
qualitative studies cite interviews but do not explain how respondents were selected or fail to 
explain who was interviewed, when, where and how. Security issues and the need to protect 
respondents in conflict situations partly explain this lack of transparency. In many cases, 
however, little or no information is provided on how to ensure interviews were representative, 
or to allow for assessment of bias in research design. Lack of transparency on methodology 
does not necessarily indicate that no evidence base exists, but impedes assessment of the 
quality of the evidence. 
Grading of the nature and extent of evidence was further complicated by several constraints. 
First, it is difficult to separate evidence from its conceptual framing. Particularly with regard 
to hybrid governance, new insights rely as much on the theoretical framing as on the 
empirical evidence. Second, in several cases ‘evidence’ includes citations from the author’s 
wide research experience in the field. These references were cited as examples to illustrate 
theoretical points, but are not always focused on the case at hand nor can they be considered 
solid evidence.  Other sources involved introductory articles that used empirical evidence 
from other articles to make theoretical points.  
A substantive constraint of the databases was the limited amount of ‘grey literature’ such as 
research reports, briefing papers, advocacy documents and policy papers. Very few of these 
reports were found with the first search strategy. Because of a growing interest from 
policymakers and practitioners in resource governance in conflict-affected areas, a growing 
number of reports is being produced by donors, policymakers, advocacy groups, practitioners 
and consultants that contain valuable evidence. These reports are often considered significant 
by experts and contain relevant empirical evidence, but are not found in academic databases. 
Nevertheless, these sources include detailed accounts of resource-related aspects of conflict; 
resource control and management; livelihoods; and human rights violations in conflict-
affected areas. These studies have also paid particular attention to the position of conflict-
affected populations, in contrast to much of the academic literature. In order to include this 
evidence in the review, experts were invited to identify influential non-academic references. 
There was some hesitation to share these sources, partly because this grey literature is 
considered as part of the intellectual capital by researchers and thus is not easily shared.  
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Assessment of the evidence base of the literature 
 
Natural resource abundance and the ‘resource curse’ 
Since the end of the 1980s, there has been much discussion about the existence of a ‘resource 
curse’, the idea that “natural resource abundance (or at least the abundance of particular types 
of natural resources) increases the likelihood that countries will experience negative 
economic, political and social outcomes” (Rosser 2006: 7). A wide range of topics associated 
with this phenomenon has been studied.5  
A first group of researchers has explored the relationship between natural resource abundance 
and poor economic performance. For instance, economists such as Sachs & Warner (1995), 
Auty (2001), Neumayer (2004), Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) and Lamb et al. (2009) argue 
that there is a negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth. Part of their explanation lies in the fact that the governments of these countries fail to 
manage large resource revenues in a sustainable manner.  
Other scholars have concentrated on the relationship between natural resource abundance and 
low levels of democracy. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) argue that African resource-
dependent countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Gabon, Cameroon, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo tend to be more authoritarian or experience considerable problems 
consolidating democracy. Ross (2001) examines possible explanations for the poor 
performance of resource-exporting governments in terms of managing their economies. 
According to Ross, this may be partly due to the fact that the resource sectors in resource-
dependent countries are often dominated by badly run, state-owned enterprises and that the 
governments of resource-dependent states seem to be incapable of enforcing property rights.  
A third group of authors has illustrated the relationship between oil wealth and rent-seeking 
behaviour. There is a considerable body of scholarship on the phenomenon of what has been 
categorised as the ‘rentier state’, that is, “a state that receives substantial rents from foreign 
individuals, concerns or governments” (Mahdavy 1970: 428, quoted in Ross 2001: 329). 
Presenting findings from a comparative study on the political and economic problems of a 
group of developing petroleum-exporting countries (Nigeria, Iran, Algeria, Indonesia, and 
Venezuela), Karl (1999) argues that these countries have invariably been characterised by 
governments heavily dependent on oil rents, weak institutional frameworks, and economies 
suffering from the symptoms of the ‘Dutch disease’ (Karl, 1997, as discussed in Christensen 
1999). Kaldor, Karl, and Said (2007) have examined the relationship between oil dependence 
and the likelihood of conflict, concentrating on six countries with a considerable oil wealth 
(Angola, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Russia/Chechnya). According to the 
authors, many oil-rich countries go through what they describe as a “rent-seeking cycle”, 
which consists of four stages: state-building, stabilisation, predation, and state failure (Kaldor 
et al. 2007). 
Yet, as Rosser (2006) also notes, the available evidence on the existence of a ‘resource curse’ 
is far from conclusive. First of all, it is unclear whether these studies have appropriately 
measured natural resource abundance. In most cases, they have measured it either in terms of 
the ratio of countries’ natural resource exports to GDP, or the ratio of countries’ natural 
resource exports to total exports. Authors who use different measurement strategies - for 
instance, indicators of resource abundance that estimate natural capital in USD per capita -
                                                        
5
 There is also a large body of literature on the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict which is 
addressed in this paper. 
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have found less support for the existence of a resource curse (see for instance Brunnschweiler 
2008). There are also questions surrounding the proposed direct causal relationship between 
resource abundance and negative development outcomes such as corruption, authoritarianism, 
and clientelism. More research is needed to identify other possible intervening variables and 
to achieve a better understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying the resource curse 
(Rosser 2006: 10-12).  
A substantial part of the literature on the resource curse is focused only at the level of the 
nation-state. Different regions within the same country often experience significant 
disparities in terms of natural resource endowments and give different results so development 
outcomes should also be examined at the sub-national level (Carter 2008). Also, in most 
cases the surveyed studies on the resource curse adopt a purely macro-level approach. Their 
primary goal is to examine large-scale trends at the political and economic level; they are less 
concerned with describing dynamics at the micro-level of society. Consequently, there is 
little information on how various aspects of the resource curse have affected different groups 
of end-users. For example, in their study on the impact of oil wealth and oil dependence on 
violent conflict, Basedau and Lay (2009) hypothesise that the availability of large revenues 
per capita from resources explains why in some cases the resource curse holds, while in 
others, a stabilising rentier effect can be observed (i.e. regimes buying peace by making use 
of revenue from abundant resources such as oil). The authors find support for their hypothesis 
through multivariate cross-country regressions and argue that high resource wealth per capita 
tends to be associated with less violence. While these findings suggest an intriguing general 
trend, populations affected by conflict are completely left out of the picture. By relying on 
resource wealth per capita, the authors also neglect differences within the population and the 
possible consequences for disputes at the local level.  
To conclude, three main themes have dominated the literature on the resource curse: the 
relationship between natural resource abundance and poor economic performance; the 
relationship between natural resource abundance and low levels of democracy; and the 
relationship between oil wealth and rent-seeking behaviour. There has been criticism of the 
indicators used to measure natural resource abundance, of the analysis of the causal 
mechanisms underlying the resource curse, and of the state-centric focus of much of the 
literature. Limited efforts have also been made to investigate the consequences of the 
resource curse for different groups of people within conflict-affected populations. More 
research is thus needed to assess how the latter have dealt with the consequences of processes 
engendered (or believed to be engendered) by the resource curse, such as the weakening of 
resource property rights and the emergence of unstable systems of resource governance.  
 
Greed as an explanatory factor of armed struggle 
A considerable number of studies assess armed actors’ rapacity or greed for natural resource 
revenues as a key factor in explaining the onset and persistence of armed conflict (Berdal & 
Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Collier, who is generally considered the founding 
father of this line of research, states that “conflicts are far more likely to be caused by 
economic opportunities than by grievance” (Collier 2000: 91). His early work, mostly co-
authored with Hoeffler, develops the so-called ‘opportunity hypothesis’: violent insurgency 
occurs when there is an opportunity to loot. In his later work, Collier reformulated his model 
and proposed a ‘feasibility hypothesis’ in which rebellion occurs where it is materially 
feasible both from a financial and military point of view (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2009, 
as discussed in Mildner et al. 2011: 162–163). 
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While highly influential and being a powerful source of inspiration to policymaking,6 both 
the opportunity hypothesis and the feasibility hypothesis have received considerable criticism. 
Several critics have argued that the evidence in support of a causal relationship between civil 
war onset and natural resource abundance is rather meagre. In her examination of existing 
quantitative research on the aforementioned relationship, Rigterink (2010) observes that there 
is scholarly disagreement over various basic technical issues such as the choice of war 
database, the choice and source of control variables, the way in which natural resource 
abundance should be quantified, and the interpretation of observed correlations. As a result, 
authors using similar theoretical models and testing the same hypotheses have reached 
radically different conclusions. Ross (2006) argues that much of the literature on the 
relationship between natural resources and violent conflict has suffered from problems of 
measurement error, endogeneity, lack of robustness, and uncertainty about causal 
mechanisms. Le Billon (2004: 572; 581) criticises the same literature for failing to explain 
why an abundance of valuable resources is not a necessary or sufficient factor of conflict. He 
emphasises the need to consider the geography and political economy of different types of 
resources, as these characteristics have an important impact on the vulnerability of societies 
to armed conflict. Nathan (2005: 13) warns that that arguments presented in studies of 
African civil wars relying on Collier and Hoeffler’s model (e.g. Anyanwu 2002), should be 
taken with a grain of salt, since quantitative data on African states are often incomplete and 
of low quality.7  
As is the case for the literature on the resource curse, a considerable number of papers 
reviewed in the systematic mapping process analyse macro-level processes rather than micro-
level dynamics. This macro-oriented approach tends to result in rather unsophisticated 
analyses, which downplay the importance of various complex political and social processes at 
the grassroots level. Winslow and Woost (2004) for instance suggest that Collier’s feasibility 
hypothesis is highly reductionist because it only concentrates on the economic considerations 
of belligerents: 
Culture, ideology and power struggles disappear to be replaced by simple financial 
feasibility. Rebel leaders are reduced to a perverse form of that old staple of 
neoclassical economics, the rationally calculating generic man who, given enough 
funding and the right advertising, can manipulate almost anyone to follow any cause 
(Winslow and Woost 2004: 16). 
Similarly, Cramer (2002) criticises rational choice theories of conflict such as Collier’s for 
violating “the complexity of individual motivation” and for “razing the individual (and key 
groups) down to monolithic maximizing agents” (Cramer 2002: 1846). The ‘greed’ literature 
relies on the assumption that all rebels share the same two characteristics: they are profit-
maximising individuals, and they search for power. According to the same literature, the 
series of grievances they cite as the official reason for their insurgency is merely to justify 
their actions vis-à-vis the international community. The validity of these assumptions is 
hardly demonstrated by any of the authors; it is simply taken for granted that, regardless of 
the societies in which they occur, civil wars are caused by the feasibility of predation (Nathan 
2005: 19–21).  
                                                        
6
 As Cramer has noted, the “greed literature” has had an important impact on policy debates, for instance 
through its influence on the research initiative of the World Bank on the economics of civil war, crime and 
violence (Cramer 2002: 1848). 
7
 It is recognised in these studies that African governments usually lack the necessary financial and logistical 
means to collect accurate figures on their GDP, their population size, and other features.  
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In conclusion, even if the literature on economic motivations of armed actors has been very 
influential, the quality of the evidence advanced to prove a direct causal relationship between 
natural resource abundance and the onset of civil war is very limited. Also, this literature 
lacks attention to the implications of geographic and politico-economic features of different 
types of resources, and underestimates the complex political and social processes at the 
micro-level. In order to achieve a more profound and subtle understanding of the relationship 
between natural resource abundance and conflict, future research thus needs to break away 
from preconceived ideas about the possible motives, goals and ways of behaviour of 
belligerents. 
 
War economies, criminality and rebel governance 
The economic motives of armed actors have not only been examined in quantitative studies 
supporting the ‘greed argument’. A considerable number of surveyed papers focus on the 
economic dimensions of contemporary conflicts. Some of these papers, mostly written from a 
political economy perspective, investigate the relationship between economic globalisation, 
organised crime, and the illicit trade in natural resources. These argue that in resource-rich 
countries - characterised by political and economic misrule, poorly functioning governance 
structures, and endemic corruption - the exploitation and trade of natural resources is often 
controlled by transnational networks composed of state officials, army officers and/or 
warlords, private companies, brokers, entrepreneurs and political and economic elites. The 
members of these networks are seen to derive various personal benefits from their business 
operations in unstable environments, where they can easily bend the law to their advantage 
(Aning 2003; Taylor 2003; Nordstrom 2004; Silberfein 2004; Wennmann 2005; Sorensen 
2006). Reno (2006: 39) points out that during the civil war in Sierra Leone, “violent political 
networks (…) created a social context in which key officials supported militarized 
clandestine commerce in natural resources”. Duffield (2001) develops the concept of 
‘emerging political complexes’ to describe how economic life in many conflict-affected areas 
in the Global South is dominated by privatised cross-border networks of state and non-state 
actors linked to the global shadow economy. 
Several surveyed papers focus on the local dimension of war economies and pay particular 
attention to the economic agendas and strategies of armed actors. Reports by Human Rights 
Watch (2005) and Global Witness (2009) document in detail the role of armed groups in the 
exploitation and trade of natural resources in eastern DR Congo and analyse commodity 
chains linking local centres of resource production to global markets. While providing useful 
empirical evidence on local economic conditions in conflict-affected (mining) areas, these 
studies start from the underlying assumptions that armed groups are guided mainly by 
economic incentives, and that the assumed self-financing nature of conflict is leading to a 
mutation in the character of violence and provoking a criminalisation of warfare (Garrett et 
al., 2009).  The same studies also neglect the complexity of war economies. One exception is 
Goodhand’s analysis of Afghanistan’s war economy, which is based on the recognition that 
in what is usually considered a war economy, different incentive systems need to be 
distinguished, as well as three types of economic interaction: a coping or survival economy, a 
shadow economy, and a war economy (Goodhand, 2008). Other studies tend to differentiate 
much less between (i) activities that relate to the production, mobilisation, and allocation of 
economic resources aimed at waging and sustaining war, and (ii) activities conducted outside 
state-regulated frameworks not intended to finance official military strategies. There is 
limited recognition in the surveyed literature that in conflict areas, different resource 
extraction scenarios may function with varying degrees of influence on conflict 
dynamics. Little is also known about governance and power structures defining local 
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conditions in conflict-affected mining zones, about the effect of armed actors’ strategies on 
the economic position of people at the local level, or about how the latter interact with, or 
resist, these strategies. 
 
Some studies analysing ‘shadow networks’ mainly summarise and reproduce information 
from open sources such as newspaper articles, internet publications, and NGO reports. Other 
studies provide a stronger evidence base resulting from fieldwork and interviews with 
different local stakeholders (i.e. the members of these networks, their beneficiaries and their 
victims). Scholars such as Reno (2006) and Nordstrom (2004) use various qualitative 
research techniques such as semi-structured interviews, ethnographic observation, and 
participant observation to check and crosscheck facts and to collect solid background 
information on the networks they are investigating. Others are less rigorous in their 
methodological approach. Taylor (2003), for instance, draws most data for his article on 
clandestine networks in Central Africa from newspapers, UN reports, and publications of 
other academic scholars even though some of these sources have been heavily criticised for 
being biased and untrustworthy (see for instance Rubbers’ (2004) critique of the UN Report 
on Congo of 2001). The same is true of Reyntjens (2005), who analyses the “criminalisation 
of public space” in Africa’s Great Lakes region using evidence almost exclusively drawn 
from UN reports and NGO publications. While the data in these publications are not 
necessarily wrong, comparison with first-hand observations and interview material would 
allow for richer analysis and more robust conclusions. 
Unlike the studies contributing to the literature on ‘greed’, most papers interested in the 
phenomenon of ‘shadow networks’ in fragile and conflict-affected areas include a micro-
level perspective. However, many of the surveyed papers are inclined to focus attention on 
one specific group of actors: those involved in high-level corruption, such as government 
officials, army officers, rebel commanders, and powerful businessmen. The principal aim of 
most of these studies has been to describe the modus operandi of (cross-border) elite 
networks in resource-rich yet institutionally weak states that seek to establish a connection 
with the global economy through the illicit trade in natural resources. Although recent years 
have witnessed a growing body of literature on how ordinary people in fragile and conflict-
affected areas position themselves vis-à-vis these networks (see for example Jackson 2002; 
Nordstrom 2004; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004; Raeymaekers 2007; Ansoms and 
Marysse 2011), there is still a lack of clear understanding of the daily forms of interaction 
between network members and various groups of actors at the grassroots level. 
A relatively new research theme in the literature on resources, conflict and governance is 
rebel governance. Several papers that were surveyed focused particularly on the governance 
capacities or conduct of rebel groups and militias. For other authors, rebel governance mainly 
concerns the rebels’ extraction of resources from the population. As they argue, governance 
arrangements aim at streamlining this extraction (Kasfir 2005; Mampilly 2007; Weinstein 
2007). Only a few studies deal directly with the subject explicitly, and are mainly limited to 
African cases (the exception being Sri Lanka).  This results in a lack of comparative material 
to make conclusive statements.  
Most studies on rebel governance follow qualitative methods to construct case studies, but 
Weinstein (2007) and Mampilly (2007) make cross-country comparisons and present some 
quantitative evidence. However, there is no large-N database yet allowing for cross-country 
quantitative comparisons. One of the main difficulties in creating such a database is in 
accounting for the wide variation, both in form and function, of rebel governance. While 
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existing case studies present interesting findings, they are too few to allow for in-depth 
analysis of the phenomenon; more research is needed to extend our knowledge. 
In sum, there is a substantial and growing body of qualitative scholarship on the economic 
dimensions of civil war. Attention has been paid to the different roles that resources play in 
war economies, to the ways in which ‘shadow networks’ establish links between war zones 
and the global economy, and to the ways in which resources shape systems of rebel 
governance. Yet, although much good quality information has been gathered on economic 
activities in war zones, there has been a tendency to look primarily at activities believed to be 
directly connected to the war efforts of belligerents. In order to do justice to the complexity 
of war economies, future studies need to distinguish between different forms of economic 
interaction and to take stock of the whole range of economic incentives and activities in 
conflict-affected areas.   
 
Hybrid (resource) governance arrangements   
A dominant theme in the surveyed literature was the notion of hybrid governance, referring to 
arrangements with both formal and informal components. Most of this literature attempts to 
develop a better understanding of the organisation of daily life in so-called ‘failed’, 
‘collapsed’, or ‘fragile’ states (Cleaver 2002; Menkhaus 2006; Lund 2006; Raeymaekers et al. 
2008; Boege et al. 2008; Arnaut et al. 2008; Hagmann and Péclard 2010; Garrett et al. 2009). 
Some scholars argue that the emergence of alternative or hybrid forms of governance is a 
positive evolution, which may help to fill some of the gaps created by the malfunctioning or 
absence of formal state institutions (Menkhaus 2006; Wiuff Moe 2009; Trefon and Cogels 
2006; Logan 2009; Crook and Booth 2011; Boege Clements and Brown 2009). Others state 
that these hybrid governance frameworks may contribute to the erosion of formal institutional 
arrangements established by the state (Menocal, Fritz and Rakner 2008; Schmid 2001). Still 
others claim that the outcomes of hybrid governance should be considered as variable and 
context-dependent (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1999; Raeymaekers 2009; Garrett et al. 
2009; Beall 2006).  
The literature on hybrid governance in fragile and conflict-affected areas is expanding 
quickly and has given rise to the creation of a wide range of analytical tools. However, 
theorisation and research on the phenomenon of hybrid resource governance remain 
underdeveloped, particularly with regard to conflict areas. Of the 29 papers that came out of 
the survey and that deal with issues of hybrid governance, 11 examine hybrid resource 
governance in non-conflict zones; only 7 address hybrid resource governance in conflict-
affected areas. 
The surveyed literature on hybrid governance identifies three commonalities among such 
arrangements: historicity, hybridity and negotiability. Their historicity reveals itself in the 
long and complex pedigree of the building blocks of hybrid governance. According to 
Cleaver (2002), people tend to draw on sources from the past when they are working out 
arrangements to organise various aspects of political, economic, and social life. This can be 
considered ‘institutional bricolage’, that is, “a process by which people consciously and 
unconsciously draw on existing social and cultural arrangements to shape institutions in 
response to changing situations” (Cleaver 2002: 26). Menkhaus (2006) illustrates this 
dynamic in the context of Somalia, where some local polities are run by coalitions of 
(traditional) clan elders, professional mayors, non-governmental organisations, and 
businesspeople. In some places, UNICEF municipal piped water systems have been 
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outsourced to a multi-clan consortium of businesspeople. This proves that historical forms of 
social organisation can play an important role in the development of alternative forms of 
governance in contexts of state collapse (Menkhaus 2006: 86). Regarding hybridity, Lund 
(2006) introduces the term ‘twilight institution’ to highlight the hybrid nature of alternative 
forms of governance in fragile and conflict-affected areas. He illustrates these dynamics with 
the example of vigilantes in Niger who, during the 1990s, legitimised their policing 
operations by mixing symbols of authority from the official police, the prefecture, the 
chieftaincy, and the field of witchcraft.  
Finally, the negotiability of hybrid forms of governance refers to the not fixed and stable, but 
rather fluid and unstable character of these forms of governance, that are subject to constant 
processes of bargaining between different parties. Raeymaekers (2006) notes that, during the 
period of civil war, cross-border mineral traders on the DRC-Uganda border made pre-
financing agreements with the dominant rebel movement and agreed to pay advances in taxes 
in return for the rebels’ protection; these negotiations resulted in new regulatory frameworks 
and hybrid forms of resource governance (Raeymaekers 2006: 123). Titeca (2006) highlights 
the negotiated nature of hybrid governance through long-term ethnographic fieldwork on the 
‘Opec boys’, a group of youngsters involved in the illicit trafficking of fuel in Arua, a 
Ugandan border town close to the DRC. According to Titeca, the Opec boys are engaged in a 
process of constant negotiation with local politicians - the Opec boys need the support of 
local politicians to prevent their goods from being confiscated, while the same politicians 
need the support of the Opec boys to safeguard their political power at the local level (Titeca 
2006). Both studies illustrate how resources play an important role in the emergence and 
formation of negotiated forms of governance in fragile and conflict-affected areas, although 
they are not specific to hybrid resource governance. Garrett et al. (2009) describe how one 
brigade of the Congolese army (FARDC), based in a mineral-rich district, sustained itself by 
relying on a complex mix of mining and mineral marketing activities as well as the taxation 
of mineral transport routes. The brigade set up an unofficial system of governance, which can 
be described as “coercive security governance,” that is, “an institutionalized political and 
economic system of rules that allows reliability of agreements between the military 
leadership and the civilian population” (Garrett et al. 2009: 11). 
Despite the plethora of new analytic tools from this literature, there have not been 
corresponding attempts to systematically gather empirical evidence. Some authors have 
invented new concepts without applying them to concrete cases of hybrid governance (e.g. 
Raeymaekers et al. 2008), while many of these analytic devices do not seem particularly 
suitable for the analysis of hybrid resource governance. Concepts such as ‘institutional 
bricolage’ (Cleaver 2002), ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2006), and ‘mediated statehood’ 
(Menkhaus 2006) serve well to describe certain features of hybrid governance in general, but 
they are not useful for the analysis of resource-related issues.  
Without evidence for these analytic tools, much of the literature on hybrid governance still 
relies on unsubstantiated assumptions - for example, that statehood is negotiable in all places 
and at all times. Doornbos criticises this assumption: “in today’s realities, the deliberate 
negation of crucial stakeholder interests by those in power in a number of countries may 
leave little room for any ‘negotiation’ about reconfiguring statehood to begin with” 
(Doornbos 2010: 761). There is a risk of underestimating power differences between parties 
and downplaying the structural constraints people face when they try to influence existing 
systems of natural resource governance, or when they attempt to obtain access to natural 
resources. At the same time, some research on hybrid governance tends to limit attention to 
non-state mechanisms, institutions, and rules. Researchers argue that in contexts of state 
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failure people are more inclined to resort to forms of governance rooted in local or 
indigenous practices than to forms of state governance (see for example Menkhaus 2006; 
Debiel and Lambach 2007). However, other research such as Tull’s (2003) points at 
continuities with, and recycling of, formal governance practices, as is the case in the DRC 
where local strongmen rely on the existing administrative apparatus despite revolting against 
the central regime in Kinshasa. Likewise, Dobler (2009) describes how local administrators 
on the Namibian border with Angola continue to apply state regulations in their daily work: 
“their interest in expanding the state’s reach is both concrete and tangible; at the same time, it 
is complemented by a modernist vision of development that favours bureaucratic, formalised 
solutions and sees the state as an important factor for channelling economic change” (Dobler, 
2009: 130–131).  
Some of the reviewed literature on hybrid governance pays specific attention to the 
experiences of conflict-affected populations. This is particularly so in the case of a number of 
policy reports, which are exploring the consequences of the militarisation of mining for 
artisanal miners (Global Witness, 2009: 27–33) or are illustrating illegal taxation systems 
created by armed groups at mines in the DRC (Human Rights Watch, 2005: 51–57). Other 
studies on hybrid governance pay scant attention to the interests of conflict-affected 
populations. Some papers are limited to an evaluation of newly emerging institutions, 
mechanisms, and procedures in contexts of state fragility. They neglect the people creating, 
(ab)using, (re)shaping, operating, or sabotaging them. For example, Menkhaus (2006) 
contends that “however vulnerable (…) local systems of governance are, they have the added 
advantage of enjoying a high degree of legitimacy and local ownership, something that 
cannot always be said of the inorganic, top-down state building projects associated with 
national reconciliation conferences (…)” (Menkhaus, 2006: 82–83). This suggests a binary 
opposition between local systems of governance - organic, bottom-up processes of growth 
with widespread acceptance among the population - and national state-building projects -
inorganic, top-down processes of growth with a lack of popular support. No empirical 
evidence is provided to support the argument, however, such as concrete examples of 
problems or cases handled by local governance systems.  
Complementary to the focus on ‘failed’ states, hybrid governance has also attracted increased 
interest in the analysis of borderlands. Some of the reviewed studies note that in countries 
where state power is weak, border areas distinguish themselves from other geographic areas 
through a higher level of ‘legal pluralism’ (Roitman 2005: 18): multiple state and non-state 
authorities try to profit from local economic activities by taxing economic operators and by 
subjecting them to a wide variety of rules and regulations. It is argued that this is especially 
so when the borderland concerned is rich in natural resources.  
Several studies document ordinary people taking advantage of the regulatory imbroglio 
characteristic of borderlands in weak states. In many parts of West and Central Africa, illicit 
cross-border trade has witnessed a dramatic expansion in the past few decades. Cross-border 
trading networks have capitalised on the porosity of international borders, the lack of serious 
border controls, and the malfunctioning of public services to import and export goods in 
unofficial ways (MacGaffey 1991; Meagher 2001, 2003; Chalfin 2001; Nugent et al. 1996). 
A number of studies illustrate the negotiability of this cross-border trade and the 
establishment of a set of ‘practical norms’ that diverge from the official laws and regulations, 
and that result from on-going processes of negotiation between those who monitor cross-
border trade flows and those who organise them (Titeca 2006; Titeca and De Herdt 2010).   
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The evidence base of these studies suffers from several shortcomings and weaknesses. First, 
authors tend to over-generalise existing trading dynamics, implying that all traders operating 
in a certain area organise their activities the same way. Roitman (2005) overemphasises the 
criminal character of certain forms of cross-border trade in West Africa. In contrast, 
MacGaffey (1991) gives an exaggeratedly rosy picture of cross-border trade in Central Africa, 
thereby contributing to the depiction of the informal economy as an overly benign 
phenomenon. Secondly, some of these borderlands studies provide limited empirical 
evidence for the arguments they develop on natural resource governance. Chalfin (2001), for 
instance, contends that the cross-border trade in North-Eastern Ghana plays an important role 
in the “discursive constitution of the state” and in its “practical and experiential realisation”. 
Although this research is based on long-term anthropological fieldwork, it does not outline 
the research design nor does it provide detailed information about the research techniques 
used. Finally, many surveyed borderlands studies too easily assume that the dynamics of 
hybrid resource governance in border areas are necessarily different from those in other parts 
of the country. Because borderlands have many distinctive features, it is assumed that the 
ways of exploiting, trading, and managing natural resources in those places must also be 
radically different. While studies on borderlands contain a considerable number of case 
studies, the literature review did not find any research that systematically analyses the 
similarities and differences between hybrid governance in borderlands settings, and hybrid 
governance in other areas. 
Despite these concerns, the reviewed studies on resource governance in borderlands are 
characterised by a relatively strong focus on conflict-affected populations, and have 
considered them in the development of the research design and in the definition of the 
research focus. Studies examine how the political, economic, and socio-cultural 
characteristics of border settings influence people’s actions, strategies, and choices. 
Borderlands research considers various groups of actors who operate at different levels of 
society and wield varying degrees of power. Contributors to a volume edited by Nugent and 
Asiwaju (1996), for example, focus on ordinary people in different parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, dealing with the advantages and disadvantages of living in a border area, and paying 
specific attention to individual actors’ agency. Other scholars put emphasis on the forces that 
limit their freedom of action. In her research on cross-border trade in West Africa, Meagher 
documents the astuteness of certain traders who manage to circumvent legal regulations and 
exploit loopholes in the system, and also discusses the elements that make life difficult for 
them (Meagher 2001, 2003).  It should be emphasised, however, that the richly documented 
studies of Nugent, Asiwaju and Meagher pertain to areas not considered to be conflict-
affected. Despite the growing literature on hybrid governance arrangements, the literature 
searches highlight the dearth of publications dealing with the importance of these 
arrangements in resource-rich and conflict-affected regions, and the implications for the 
inhabitants of these areas. 
 
Resource governance and post-conflict reconstruction 
A relatively recent and prominent theme in the reviewed literature is the role and 
development of a solid, transparent, and well-functioning system of resource governance for 
resource-rich countries recovering from violent conflict. Two assumptions support this 
perspective: (i) authors believe that a transparent and accountable resource governance 
system will help to prevent new eruptions of resource-related violence, and (ii) authors 
assume that this will contribute to the country’s economic revival, as it will create a more 
stable business climate, attract new investors, and ensure that governments use their resource 
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revenues to improve the well-being of the population (Binns and Maconachie 2005; 
Maconachie and Hilson 2011; Global Witness 2010; Ansoms and Marysse 2011). 
The literature on the links between resource governance and post-conflict reconstruction 
covers a number of topics, including the renegotiation of mining contracts concluded during 
war situations (Ford and Tienhaara 2010), the fight against corrupt practices inherited from 
war-time political elites (Grant 2005), and initiatives to render the commodity chain of so-
called ‘conflict minerals’ more transparent (Cuvelier 2013; IPIS 2011). Other topics include 
the development of alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants and unemployed youth in the 
artisanal mining sector (Maconachie and Hilson 2011; McCandless and Tyler 2006), the need 
to establish a solid regulatory framework (Garrett et al. 2010), and problems associated with 
the continued militarisation of the mining sector (de Koning 2009; Garrett et al. 2009). 
Much of this literature is directly oriented towards policy. It relies on an evidence base 
comprising interviews and consultations with stakeholders in the various branches of the 
resource sector such as trade union representatives, cooperatives, public servants and 
decision-makers at the local, regional, and national levels. However, part of these 
publications tends to be based on normative and unsubstantiated assumptions. Several studies 
assume a direct relationship between resources and conflict without establishing the validity 
or empirical evidence of this link. This is particularly the case for reports published by policy 
groups that call for an end to the trade in minerals from conflict areas. These calls are based 
on the assumption that armed groups use the revenues from the conflict trade to finance their 
war efforts (see for example IPIS 2002; Global Witness 2009; UNSC 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2008), yet these studies present very little empirical evidence. There is also a lack of detailed 
information on how state and non-state armed groups manage resource revenues, which 
makes it premature to present strong statements regarding their motivations for controlling 
mineral-rich areas. 
Research on the role of resources in post-conflict reconstruction is generally geared towards 
finding solutions for the management of resource abundance in areas where the state is 
struggling to get a firm footing, a situation considered to be intrinsically problematic and 
conflict-prone. There appears to be widespread conviction that resources should be high on 
the policy agenda, because of their potential role as a curse or blessing. The dominant 
argument that resource abundance is an ambiguous and unpredictable force and must be 
checked by a strong government, is not supported by empirical evidence but stems from the 
same normative assumptions that have dominated the debate on the relationship between 
resources and conflict in the past few decades. This implies the risk that resource-related 
problems will be addressed with inappropriate, ready-made solutions. An example is the call 
for the formalisation of the artisanal mining sector in areas emerging from a long period of 
violent conflict such as Sierra Leone. Because of the belief that the illegal diamond trade was 
a key factor in prolonging the civil war, decision-makers at the national and international 
level have emphasised regaining control over the diamond trade. Efforts have been made to 
bring the processes of exploiting and trading diamonds under government control so that 
rebel groups will not have the opportunity to profit. Meanwhile, other resource-related 
problems, such as persistent corruption or the marginalisation of artisanal miners, run a 
serious risk of being neglected or ignored.  
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Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
 
This paper has assessed the quality of data presented in studies that analyse the different ways 
resource governance affects people living in fragile and conflict-affected areas. Resources 
and their linkages with conflict-affected areas have attracted much attention in recent 
literature on conflict dynamics, which has led to the development of a vast body of valuable 
case studies and quantitative models. The literature survey, however, shows considerable 
variation in the evidence base for the different claims being made. Much attention has been 
paid to claims that resource abundance increases the risk of bad governance and conflict, and 
that economic incentives are the explanatory factor of armed groups’ strategies. While these 
claims have a significant impact on policy and have had the effect of narrowing down the 
attention to resource control in conflict settings, the evidence in support of these claims is 
largely macro-level orientated and tends to overlook the complexities of armed actors’ 
motivations and incentive structures. The same literature tends to overlook the local level and 
the position and role of populations. Valuable local-level empirical data on aspects of 
resource control in conflict areas are presented in policy-oriented reports, but most of these 
studies do not question their assumptions regarding the connections between resources and 
conflict, and fail to move beyond normative perspectives. 
Because of the limited evidence base, the assumed links between resources and conflict have 
been challenged by studies aimed at unravelling the complexities of governance structures in 
conflict areas, but also increasingly in borderlands. Yet even these studies pay limited 
attention to the particular characteristics of resource governance. Conflict studies that do, 
tend to focus on the interplay between formal and non-formal actors, institutions, and 
processes from a more general perspective, and are characterised by a lack of conceptual 
clarity. Studies more generally analysing resource governance frameworks, in turn, usually 
do not pertain to conflict situations. Moreover, what we know about the effects of resource 
governance on local populations is either case-specific or fragmentary, and seldom 
specifically relates to conflict-affected regions. There is a lack of empirical data on the 
impact of emerging hybrid resource governance systems on populations living in fragile and 
conflict-affected areas, and we know very little about how ordinary people interact with 
power-holders and how these interactions inform existing hybrid governance structures.   
The assessment of the quality of available information in the selected literature was hindered 
by a number of constraints. While many studies claim to be based on empirical observations, 
in most cases little or no information was provided on evidence collection. This is 
particularly the case with studies that rely on ethnographic approaches, less so with 
quantitative studies. The absence of a clear description of the methodology does not rule out 
that studies are based on rigorous methods of data-collection and that the information 
collected represents relevant evidence. However, authors often fail to explain what they 
regard to be ‘evidence’ or why specific information is considered to be evidence for the 
claims they make.  There is also scant recognition that underlying research questions define 
the kind of evidence authors are looking for. This is particularly problematic for studies 
relying on secondary sources, and consequently tends to reinforce dominant normative claims 
on resources and conflict. 
From the analysis of the selected literature, a number of gaps and areas for future research 
can be identified that can be sorted into three main fields: (i) hybrid resource governance; (ii) 
rebel governance and resources; (iii) and the position and participation of local populations in 
resource governance. 
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Hybrid resource governance 
Although institutional outcomes of interactions between state and non-state actors in conflict-
affected areas have received increased research attention, limited consensus exists on the 
nature and popular legitimacy of these new governance frameworks. Little evidence also 
exists on the impact of conflict environments and rebel interference on the institutional 
organisation of pre-existing informal systems of resource exploitation and control. In addition 
to historical research on conflict changing informal regulatory systems, there is a need for 
micro-level comparative research on hybrid resource governance frameworks in conflict-
affected areas and under peaceful conditions. This will make it possible to understand 
whether, and how, conflict conditions affect the development of alternative, hybrid 
governance frameworks.  The interconnectedness of local resource exploitation and global 
markets has received attention from academics, advocacy groups, donors, and international 
agencies, leading to numerous reports on commodity chains and the different actors involved. 
However, this knowledge provides a limited understanding of the increasing engagement of 
informal actors in local and cross-border processes of resource governance. While there is a 
growing literature on the different functions of informality in a context of ‘hybrid’ 
governance, little is known about the dynamics and effects of informal globalisation and the 
increased connection of non-state actors to globalised economic networks with natural 
resources as key commodities.  
 
Rebel governance and resources 
Limited information exists on the governance capacity and performance of non-state armed 
groups. Few studies have been conducted on their provision of basic public services such as 
security and justice and their attempts to involve civilians living in the territories they control 
in their own governance frameworks. Evidence exists on rebels’ income-generating strategies, 
but this evidence is mainly used to support claims that armed groups are guided by predatory 
behaviour, and that control over resources is needed to finance war efforts. Less is known 
about the functioning of rebel-controlled tax regimes to regulate commercial activities, 
racketeer practices, or rebel provision of security in return for resources.  
 
Resource governance and the position and strategies of people living in conflict-affected 
areas 
Some of the selected studies illustrate the remarkable tendency of groups to create their own 
sets of rules and principles for the organisation of different spheres of life (including the 
exploitation and trade of natural resources) when faced with the threats of uncertainty and 
insecurity as a result of the malfunctioning of the state. Limited knowledge exists, however, 
about the ways in which actors at the micro-level position themselves vis-à-vis these newly 
created systems of local governance. As stated before, there is also limited evidence available 
on how hybrid arrangements of resource governance in fragile or conflict-affected areas 
impact on people’s access to, and control over, local resources. Nevertheless, increased 
attention has been paid to how people survive in conflict conditions, with growing evidence 
on livelihood diversification strategies and the emergence of new forms of risk-induced 
economic activities. The same literature has observed a shift in conflict-affected rural areas to 
various economic activities outside the agricultural sector (described as ‘distress-push 
diversification’). While existing literature offers some insights into the resilience and 
adaptation of populations living in conflict-affected areas, less is known about how shifts in 
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power constellations and reconfigurations in hybrid governance frameworks affect 
livelihoods.  
To conclude, the literature review has revealed that there is limited consensus on how to 
approach and conceptualise resource-related issues in conflict-affected areas. In addition, 
dominant concepts lack empirical testing. In particular, there is little evidence on how 
conflict impacts frameworks of resource governance, how these frameworks define people’s 
access to and control over resources, and how in return populations deal with these 
frameworks. Little is known either about the specific role of armed actors in shaping these 
resource arrangements. Most studies start from the assumption that these actors are driven by 
predatory ambition and pay limited attention to their attempts to create or support local 
governance processes. The main challenge, therefore, will be the development of a 
comprehensive micro-perspective on ‘hybrid’ resource governance arrangements and to 
integrate resource-related issues into research on peace, security, and post-conflict 
reconstruction.  
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